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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, } 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- vs. -
RAYMOND DODGE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
10771 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Raymond Dodge, appeals from 
a conviction of the crime of first degree perjury on 
Jury trial in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber 
County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with 
the crime of first degree perjury. A jury trial was 
held September 28 and 29, 1966. The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty as charged, and the Honorable 
Charles G. Cowley imposed sentence upon the ap-
pellant of confinement in the state prison for the in-
determinate term as provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
Second District Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent fundamentally agrees with the 
statement of facts submitted in the appellant's brief, 
but offers the following as a more detailed and ac-
curate statement of evidence as received at trial 
during the presentation of the state's case. 
Mr. Cecil Tucker, an official court reporter, testi· 
fied that on the 10th day of December 1965 he had 
occasion to report the testimony of a habeas corpus 
proceeding brought by Tommy Danks agaim:.t 
Warden John Turner (T-11). During this hearing the 
appellant, after being sworn (T-12), testified on be· 
half of Tommy Danks. Appellant when asked if he 
had seen Bill Newbold during the month of March, 
1965, in a tavern on 25th Street, stated Bill Newbold 
had been pointed out to him. Further that Bill New· 
bold, during a conversation, explained to appellant 
that in order to avoid difficulty with his wife he 
(Newbold) had falsely accused Tommy Danks of the 
crime of robbery (T-23). The appellant had likewise 
testified the date of the meeting in the 25th Street 
tavern was either the 18th or 19th of March, 1965 
(T-25). 
Bill Newbold testified that he could not recall 
having seen the appellant prior to the habeas corpus 
hearing in December 1965 (T-26). On the 10th of 
3 
March, 1965, he was admitted to an Ogden hospital 
for a double hernia operation (T-26). As a result of 
the operation, and subsequent complications, New-
bold stated he did not leave either the hospital or his 
home from March 10th to March 18th, 1965 (T-27). 
During the period of time between March 14, 1965, 
and April 25, 1965, Newbold did not go to 25th Street 
for any reason (T-40). 
Doctor Keith Stratford testified he performed 
surgery upon Bill Newbold on the 11th of March, 
1965 (T-30). The doctor stated infection developed 
in the incision complicating Newbold's post-opera-
tive recovery (T-31). It was further testified by the 
doctor that Newbold did not appear capable of go-
ing anywhere but home when he examined him on 
March 19, 1965. 
Mrs. Lorraine Newbold testified that from March 
14, 1965, until April 22, 1965, her husband, Bill New-
bold, did not leave their home except to visit the of-
fice of Doctor Stratford (T-71). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
REGARDING THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
SECOND DEGREE PERJURY BECAUSE APPROPRI-
ATE INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT REQUESTED. 
The record does not disclose any request to the 
trial court on the part of appellant to submit the 
issue of perjury in the second degree to the jury. 
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Absent such timely and appropriate request, appel-
lant may not complain of the court's failure to give 
such instructions. The respondent concedes perjury 
in the second degree is an included offense in the 
charge of perjury in the first degree. State v. Hutch· 
inson, 4 Utah 2d 404, 295 P .2d 345 ( 1956). 
This court addressing the issue in State v. Sulli· 
van, 73 Utah 582, 276 Pac. 166 (1929) said: 
Before the defendant can be heard to complain be-
cause trial court did not instruct upon the law of 
lesser offenses included within the crime charged 
such defendant must have requested instructions 
upon the included offense or offenses. (citing num-
erous cases). 
Justice Larsen observed in State v. DuBois, 98 
Utah 234, 98 P.2d 354 (1940): 
Having approved the instructions as given and re-
quested no others, counsel should not be heard to 
complain that the court did not constitute itself 
counsel in the cause, and submit other theories not 
urged by defendant just because the court may 
think such theories of defense could have been 
urged. It is the court's duty to try the issues made 
by the parties and not make cases for them. We have 
held that where instructions are palpably erroneous 
to such an extent that they would, if followed by the 
jury prevent a fair and proper determination of the 
issues, we may notice the error without exception 
being taken. State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 
(1936); State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 
(1937). But we are aware of no holding that the 
.mere failure to give an instruction which might have 
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been given but which was not requested or called to 
the attention of the court, and no exception taken 
to the failure to be given will be noticed on appeal. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The respondent submits that the failure to give 
an instruction on the included offense on perjury 
in the second degree falls under the general rule of 
the DuBois case, and is not within the exception of 
the Cobo case. 
The appellant in his brief does not define or 
particularize the basis upon which he feels there 
was an evidentiary basis for an instruction on the 
law of perjury in the second degree. Therefore, tak-
ing the evidence as most favorable to the trial court's 
ruling, it appears there is no factual basis for the 
publication of such an instruction. Authorities are in 
accord with this principle. 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 798 
0 945) states in part: 
Where, under the evidence the defendant must' be 
either guilty of the crime charged or not guilty of 
any, the general rule is that the court is not required, 
and may refuse, to instruct the jury as to include of-
fenses or inferior degrees thereof. 
Accord: State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215 Pac. 53i 
0923); State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 126 Pac. 286 
0912). 
The respondent submits, therefore, that the ap-
pellant was not entitled to an instruction on a lesser 
included offense. 
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANT DOES NOT RAISE ISSUES 
COGNIZABLE BY THIS COURT IN POINTS 2 AND 3 OF 
HIS BRIEF. 
The appellant on page 5 of his brief simply 
states a failure on the part of the State to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt the joint union of act and 
intent. Appellant fails to elaborate or point out 
wherein the evidence is insufficient. On page 7 of 
his brief appellant argues the incompetency of his 
counsel at trial. Likewise, he fails to cite the record 
in support of his allegations and conclusions stated 
in the argument supporting point 3 of appellant's 
brief. It is respondent's position that issues presented 
by brief in this manner are not appropriate for re-
view by this court. Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 
359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952); In Re Levelles Estate, 122 
Utah 253, 248 P.2d 372 (1952). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING 
A SENTENCE WHICH WOULD BE CONSECUTIVE TO 
A TERM PROVIDING FOR A MAXIMUM OF LIFE IN 
PRISONMENT. 
Judge Charles G. Cowley of the Second Judicial 
District, after receiving a verdict of guilty from the 
jury, sentenced the appellant to serve a term of not 
less than one nor more than five years in the Utah 
State Prison (T-164). This sentence was to run con-
secutively with a fifteen year to life indeterminate 
term being served by the appellant at the time the 
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perjury offense was committed (T-161-162). Under 
Utah statutes a person having been deemed to be 
an habitual criminal shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the state prison for not less than fifteen 
years. (Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-18 (1953)). Assuming 
arguendo, that appellant correctly regards a sen-
tence under this above statute as being one for a 
maximum of life imprisonment his argument must 
of necessity fail. The sentencing judge, as required 
by law, correctly imposed judgment in making the 
sentences consecutive. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-33 
(1953). 
If respondent correctly understands appellant's 
argument, appellant argues once a defendant is 
sentenced to life imprisonment he is immune from 
punishment for further crime unless that crime is one 
for which the sentence of death is imposed. The 
state suffers from no such disability, and the con-
tention has no foundation in law or reason. This 
court, considering circumstances analogous to the 
instant case in McCoy v. Severson. 118 Utah 502, 
222 P.2d 1058 (1950) stated: 
A realistic approach to the problem suggests that 
neither a sentence for life nor a sentence from five 
years to life means that a defendant will serve his 
natural life in prison. There would have been no 
occasion to permit the termination of commutation 
if the Legislature intended that the terms could not 
be made less. For all practical purposes, a sentence 
for life must be considered in connection with the 
powers of the Board to commute the sentence to a 
fixed and shorter period. With this background, the 
8 
Legislature, when it considered the statutes dealing 
with consecutive sentences, amended one section as 
late as 1917 and never expected life sentences from 
its provisions. It must have intended to permit the 
courts the right to sentence a defendant to serve a 
period consecutive to the time his life sentence 
might be terminated. Certainly the board of pardons 
has so interpreted the Legislative intent for many 
years. 
It should be noted that although the statutes con· 1 
trolling commutation of sentence or the granting of 
pardons at the time of McCoy decision (Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-0-1 (1943)) were repealled the substance 
1 
of that statute was reenacted into its present form. ' 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-62-3 (1953). 
Similarly, in People v. Hayes. 9 Cal. App. 2d 157, 
49 P.2d 288 (1935), the California District Court of 
Appeals, dealing with facts similar to the instant 
1 
case, stated: 
The fact that a prisoner who serve a life term, and 
while serving such, dies in prison cannot serve other 
sentences imposed for other offenses and running 
consecutively does not prevent, as a matter of law 
the imposing of such consecutive sentences, even 
though ... the additional penalty cannot be im-
posed, i.e., actually inflicted upon such life termer. 
It might also be mentioned, that even where a 
prisoner is serving a life sentence this does not mean 
that he will remain in prison until he dies. Parole, 
commutation, or pardon may release him from 
prison long before his term of life ends. 
The respondent submits, th3t the subsequent 
consecutive sentence is not only permissible undE:r 
9 
the circumstances of the instant case, but necessary 
for proper judicial administration. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's contentions on appeal are totally 
without merit. No basis exists for reversal. There-
fore, respondent submits the conviction be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
